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Abstract 
 
Since the early 1990s, credit expanded relative to income, especially after 2001. It is 
hypothesized that traditionally uneven credit access and gaps in the costs of credit by 
demographic characteristics shrank during this period. Relying on data from the Federal 
Reserve’s Survey of Consumer Finance, this study looks at financial constraints, the costs 
of credit and a number of contributions to the costs of credit, including sources and types 
of loans. The results indicate that taste-based discrimination and structural discrimination 
may have persisted and possibly increased over time. Gaps in credit access and costs of 
credit have widened by race, remained high by income, but shrank by ethnicity. Part of 
the overall differences in credit access was a varying reliance on professional information 
when making decisions on debt.  
 
Keywords: Household credit, bank credit, loan denials, discrimination, debt payments, 
interest rates.  
 
Introduction 
 
Household debt can be, if used correctly, the grease for economic mobility. By 
borrowing, many more families can afford to buy a home, car, or a college education than 
would otherwise be the case. And debt allows families to smooth out income fluctuations 
due to short-term spells of unemployment, a medical emergency, among others.  
 
Traditionally, not all families had the same access to credit. The chance of getting a loan 
and the costs of debt often varied by demographic characteristics. Minorities and low-
income families in particular had fewer chances of getting a loan and paid higher costs 
for debt than their counterparts.  
 
These differences have often been the result of credit market discrimination. Specifically, 
lenders may have denied loans to some borrowers solely on the base of race, ethnicity 
and other personal traits, or they may have steered these borrowers towards higher-cost 
loan products than were available for other borrowers.  
 
Differences in credit access and costs of credit were expected to decline over time as US 
financial markets became more deregulated, starting in the late 1970s, but taking shape 
especially in the 1990s. In particular, market deregulation was meant to result in more 
competition and ultimately less financial market discrimination.  
 
Prior research has shown some decline in the financial market discrimination. From the 
late 1980s to the early 1990s, differences in the chance of getting a loan approved seemed 
to decrease. More recent research, though, found that differences in loan denial rates and 
the costs of credit persisted over time, although it is unclear if this persistence was due to 
financial market discrimination.  
 
This paper considers recent household level data on consumer debt to determine if credit 
market discrimination has declined, disappeared or persisted as financial markets have 
become more deregulated in the U.S. In particular, this paper analyzes the evidence on 
the chance of financial constraints as well as on the cost of credit for the period from 
1989 to 2004. Consequently, this paper builds on the previous research in a number of 
important aspects. First, the empirical analysis extends beyond the late 1990s to test the 
impact of the latest round of financial deregulation on discrimination. Second, the 
research considers the evidence pertaining to taste-based and structural discrimination in 
credit markets. Third, this research includes the costs of credit and not just loan denials. 
In the analysis of potential cost differences, the research pays particular attention to the 
role sources and types of loans can play for the cost of credit. Fourth, the data analysis 
compares the experience of Latinos and African-Americans with each other to see if their 
gaps with whites and with each other have changed in any meaningful way over time.  
 
I. Literature Review 
 
Debt allows families to purchase costly items and to master short-term income 
fluctuations. The biggest reason for families to go into debt is for a home, followed by 
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loans for investment properties, cars, and education (Weller and Douglas, 2007). 
Moreover, due to debt, consumption volatility is less severe than income volatility 
(Bloemen & Stancanelli, 2005; Krueger and Perri, 2002).  
 
Credit access and costs of credit, though, tend to vary by demographic characteristics. 
These include personal characteristics of the borrower, such as family size, marital status, 
living arrangements, among others, and financial characteristics, such as credit history, 
income, and wealth. Also, a credit application may be denied because of issues associated 
with a loan, e.g. a lender may be prohibited from making a particular loan. And finally, 
there are reasons specific to a lender for denying credit, e.g. a requirement to have had a 
past banking relationship with a lender (Chakravarty, 2002).  
 
These differences, though, may also result from discrimination. The origin and type of 
discrimination is debated. Becker (1957) uses the term “taste-based” discrimination, 
whereby minorities, low-income families, women, among others, receive disparate and 
less advantageous treatments than their counterparts. “Taste-based” discrimination should 
ultimately disappear with sufficient competition since it constitutes a cost to the lender.  
 
Others, though, have argued that discrimination can be structural (Dymski, 1995, 2001). 
In this perspective, the circumstances between two people can differ systematically by 
race, ethnicity, gender, or other characteristics. This view includes “taste-based” 
discrimination, but goes beyond it. Now, differences in income and wealth can 
themselves be result of previous or current systematic discrimination.  
 
Part of this structural discrimination may be access to professional financial information. 
Financial education may play an crucial role for wealth creation (Fox, and Hoffman, 
2004; Hilgert, et al., 2003; Weinberg, 2006), especially for minorities and low-income 
families (Choudhury, 2002; Lyons & Scherpf, 2004; Lyons et al., 2006; Schug et al., 
2006; Yao et al., 2005), even as effective financial education is still developing (Fox & 
Hoffman, 2004: Fox et al., 2005; Lyons et al., 2006). Low-income and minority families, 
though, are substantially less likely than their counterparts to seek information from 
professionals, when making debt decisions.1 Among whites, 45.7% relied on 
professionals in 2004, compared to 27.7% of African-Americans and 27.2% of 
Hispanics.2 This may be related to structural inequities as it may reflect wealth and 
income levels and historically established relations with financial service providers.  
 
A number of studies have documented the existence of primarily taste-based 
discrimination in financial markets, e.g. by looking at loan denial rates. The research, for 
instance, finds that loan denial rates vary by race, so that non-whites tend to have higher 
loan denial rates than whites, even after controlling for other relevant characteristics 
(Blanchflower et al., 2003; Canner et al., 1994; Cavalluzzo and Wolken, 2005; 
Cavalluzzo et al., 2002; Dymski, 2001; Gabriel & Rosenthal, 1991; Holloway & Wyly, 
                                                 
1 Professionals comprise brokers, lawyers, accountants, bankers, among others.  
2 There were no large differences with respect to collecting information themselves and relying on 
advertisements when making decisions pertaining to debt (Weller, 2007). 
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2001; Munnell, et al., 1996; Ross, 2005). Crook (1996) also finds that lower-income and 
older families were more likely than their counterparts to experience loan denials.  
 
Credit market differences by demographic characteristics also include varying costs of 
credit. Very high cost loans include payday lending, car title loans, and overdraft loans. 
Interest rates on payday loans average typically about 400% (CRL, 2006), Fox and Guy 
(2005) estimate that the median annual interest rate for a car title loan is about 300% and 
Duby et al. (2005) argue that overdraft fees can quickly translate into triple-digit 
annualized interest rates. Moreover, credit card debt often costs more than other forms of 
credit (Manning, 2000) due to higher interest rates and additional fees (Westrich and 
Bush, 2005). Finally, subprime mortgages are by definition higher cost loans.  
 
The evidence indicates that all forms of higher-cost credit are more prevalent among 
minorities and lower-income families than among their counterparts (Barr, 2001; CFA, 
1998, 1999; Stegman & Faris, 2003). For example, payday lenders targeted African-
American families, low-income families, and military families (CRL, 2005; CU, 2003; 
DOD, 2006; Graves & Peterson, 2005; Tanik , 2005). Also, repeat users of overdraft 
loans seemed to be more likely than not to be lower-income and non-white (James & 
Smith, 2006). And, car title loans tended to be more prevalent among lower-income 
families and military families than among others (Fox & Guy, 2005). And, credit card 
debt was relatively more prevalent among lower-income and minority families than 
among their families (Bird et al., 1998; African-American & Morgan, 1999; Manning, 
2000; Yoo, 1996). Moreover, the terms and conditions of credit cards tended to be worse 
for low-income families than for higher-income ones (Ausubel, 1999; Stavins, 2000). 
Furthermore, minority borrowers were more likely to receive a subprime mortgage than 
their similarly situated counterparts (Bocian et al., 2006; Fishbein & Woodall, 2006). 
 
Cost differences may also arise due segmented markets and limited services. Markets 
may be segmented because lenders tailor their products to specific groups, because of 
regulatory restrictions, such as limits on credit union activities,3 and because lenders may 
restrict their geographic scope due to limited resources or discriminatory practices, such 
as red-lining (Munnell et al., 1996; Newman & Wyly, 2004; Wyly & Hammel, 2004). 
 
Financial market deregulation, though, could have contributed to declining differences in 
credit market outcomes. Since the 1970s, deregulation resulted in a wave of merger and 
acquisition activities and consolidation in the financial services industry (Rhoades, 2000; 
Wheelock & Wilson, 2004). Evaluations of the wave of bank consolidations generally 
find that banks have become more profitable and their loan portfolios less risky (Akhigbe 
& Madura, 2004; Akhigbe et al., 2004; Al Mamun et al., 2005; Yildirim et al., 2006), 
which potentially reflected greater economies of scale and thus the possibility of 
improved banking services for previously underserved borrowers. This is further 
supported by the limited evidence that suggests that small business access to credit did 
not shrink in the wake of financial service consolidation (Avery & Samolyk, 2004; Hein 
et al., 2005; Carow et al., 2006; Rauch & Henderson, 2004; Rose 1993).  
 
                                                 
3 Limits on credit unions have decreased over time (Leggett & Strand, 2002; Tripp & Smith, 1993).  
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This tentative conclusion may be further supported by the fact that new technologies and 
policy interventions may have offset possibly adverse effects of credit market 
consolidation. More widespread use of information technologies resulted in more credit 
access for vulnerable groups, such as small businesses (Berger, 2003; Ely & Robinson, 
2001; White, 2002). In addition, regulatory tools, in particular the Community 
Reinvestment Act, and a proliferation of loan programs targeted at underserved 
borrowers seemed to help to counter the effects of credit market discrimination with 
respect to credit access and costs of credit (Bates, 2000; Bostic et al., 2002). 
 
Previous studies have found some indication that credit market discrimination may have 
persisted, but decreased over time. Cavalluzzo and Cavalluzzo (1998), for instance, find 
that financial market discrimination diminished in more competitive markets. Also, 
Dymski (2001) finds that the difference in racial inequality persisted, but declined in 
many U.S. cities between 1992 and 1998. Finally, Lyons (2003) finds that between 1992 
and 1998 all families saw improved credit access with particularly strong improvements 
for African-American families and families with low earnings.  
 
This paper expands the previous research in several ways. First, the time horizon extends 
beyond the late 1990s to test the impact of the latest round of financial deregulation on 
discrimination. Second, it considers evidence on taste-based and structural 
discrimination. Third, it includes the costs of credit. Fourth, the data analysis compares 
the experience of Latinos and African-Americans with each other.  
 
II. Credit market trends 
 
The primary data set used here is the Federal Reserves’ tri-annual data Survey of 
Consumer Finances (SCF), which includes comprehensive information on household debt 
and assets. The SCF surveys a cross-section of the U.S. population every three years with 
2004 as the last survey year. Consistent data for most variables are available since 1989.  
 
By 2004, there were still large differences by race, ethnicity and income in the probability 
of denied and discouraged applications. By 2004, 14.9% of African-American families 
and 11.9% of Hispanic families said that they did not apply for a loan because they feared 
that they would be turned down, compared to only 4.9% of whites. In addition, the share 
of discouraged loan applications continuously decreased with income. Also, African-
Americans and Hispanics were twice as likely as whites to have a denied loan application 
in 2004 and loan denial rates also tended to be higher with lower incomes (Table 1).  
 
The chance of being financially constrained seems to have increased over time. All 
groups had a higher likelihood of discouraged applications in 2004 than in 1989 and, for 
almost all groups, loan denial rates were higher in 2004 than in 1989 (Table 1).  
 
Importantly, the data also suggest diverging levels of financial constraints by income and 
possibly by race. The differences in discouraged applications widened by income and 
remained comparatively stable by race and ethnicity and denial rates diverged by income 
and by race, but narrowed between Hispanics and whites (Table 1).  
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*** INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE** 
 
Another aspect of credit market access is the cost of credit. To approximate costs, the 
ratio of debt payments to outstanding debt is calculated. Debt payments capture several 
cost components of debt – interest, fees, and other payments – terms for all loans. This 
makes it preferable to using interest rates, which only reflects one loan condition on the 
most recent loan. The composite payments measure can be influenced by the types of 
loans, by the sources of loans and by payment conditions, such as shorter or longer 
maturities. The multivariate analysis will consider a number of cost components 
separately to analyze the impact of a range of possible contributing factors.  
 
Minorities and lower-income families paid more relative to their debt than whites and 
higher-income families. For instance, African-Americans paid 22.1% of their debt in debt 
payments in 2004, compared to 19.7% for Hispanics and 15.7% for whites (Table 2). 
 
Again, credit market trends diverged, even though the median ratio of debt payments to 
debt declined for all groups. In 2004, the typical borrower had payments equal to 16.8% 
of their total debt, down from 28.2% in 1989. This was true for all groups, but there were 
larger relative declines for whites than for Hispanics between 1989 and 2004 and at about 
the same rate as for African Americans. Also, the decline in the cost of debt was 
relatively larger for higher-income families than for lower-income ones (Table 2).  
 
*** INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE *** 
 
III. Empirical analysis 
 
This section provides multivariate analyses of credit access and the cost of credit. The 
literature suggests that differences by race, ethnicity and income should have decreased 
over time, while the descriptive data indicate that differences may have actually 
increased, especially by race.  
 
IV.1 Financial constraints 
 
First, two logit regressions, one for discouraged applications and one for denied 
applications, are estimated to test for the persistence of financial constraints. In each case, 
the dependent variable takes the value of “1” if the family was financially constrained 
and “0” otherwise.  
 
The explanatory variables fall into three categories. First, there are personal 
characteristics, such as age, education, family size, marital status, race, and ethnicity. If 
race and ethnicity are correlated with financial constraints, it would be an indication of 
taste-based discrimination. Second, the analysis includes data on a family’s credit history, 
particularly an indication if a family has been delinquent for 60 days or more on any bill 
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in the past five years and if a family self-identifies as saver.4 For the years after 1995, the 
analyses also include an indicator variable if the household had declared bankruptcy over 
the past five years, an indicator variable if the household relied on itself for financial 
information on debt, an indicator variable if the household relied on professionals for 
financial information on debt, and an indicator variable if the household relied on 
advertisements for financial information. Each indicator variable takes the value of “1” if 
the answer is “yes” and zero otherwise. The professional information indicator is used as 
one measure of structural inequities. Third, the regression includes financial background 
variables, particularly income, labor force participation, net worth and homeownership. 
All four variables capture structural inequities since minorities tend to have consistently 
lower incomes than whites and since minorities and lower-income families are less likely 
to be homeowners, have less net worth and have a less labor force attachment.5  
 
Each regression is estimated separately for the period from 1989 to 1995 and for the 
years from 1998 to 2004.6 Since data on financial market competitiveness are not 
available, this split proxies for the effect of large-scale financial deregulation.  
 
With respect to discouraged applications, there are systematic differences by race, 
ethnicity and income (Table 3). Specifically, African-Americans were 89.3% more likely 
than whites to feel discouraged between 1989 and 1995, while the difference between 
Hispanics and whites was 50.0%. Also, regardless of the time period, higher-income 
families were less likely to feel discouraged from applying for a loan. Moreover, after 
1995, the difference increased by race, but declined by income and ethnicity. Still, 
Hispanics were 33.5% more likely than whites to feel discouraged.7  
 
Finally, structural differences matter for discouraged applications. Homeownership, in 
particular, shows a stronger inverse correlation with discouraged applications in the later 
years than in the earlier ones. Income is also inversely related with income, although the 
size of the estimated coefficient is lower after 1995 than before 1998. Professional 
information and household wealth, though, have no significant relationship with 
discouraged applications (Table 3).  
 
*** INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE**** 
 
These results differ in a number of important aspects from those of denied applications 
(Table 4). First, loan denial rates did not differ by ethnicity, although they varied by race. 
                                                 
4 Savers are families, who indicated that they “save income of one family member, spend the other”, “spend 
regular income, save other income”, or “save regularly by putting money aside each month”. They are 
classified as non-saver if they “don't save - usually spend more than income they”, “don't save - usually 
spend about as much as income”, or “save whatever is left over at the end of the month - no regular plan”.  
5 Wealth differed by race and ethnicity, e.g. Hispanics owned 20.6% of the average wealth of white 
families in the earlier period and 21.8% of the real net worth of white families in the latter period. Similar 
differences exist by race. Calculations are based on SCF.  
6 A likelihood ratio Chow test rejects the null hypotheses that the estimated parameters are identical for the 
two subperiods in all instances.   
7 Odds ratios are not shown here.  
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Between 1998 and 2004, African-Americans were 41.7% more likely than whites to be 
denied a loan application.  
 
Second, the difference by race dropped only slightly. In the early years, the gap between 
African-Americans and whites was with 49.5% only 6.8 percentage points higher than in 
the later years, implying a slow decrease in taste-based discrimination.  
 
Third, structural differences in part explain the gap in loan denial rates. Families, who 
relied on professional information for their debt decisions, were 17.3% less likely than 
those, who did not, to be denied a loan application. In addition, homeownership has 
become a larger predictor of loan denials over time. Even though there is no evidence for 
taste-based discrimination by ethnicity, there is evidence that structural differences can 
account for part of the gaps in loan denial rates by ethnicity after 1995 (Table 4).  
 
*** INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE **** 
 
IV.2 Cost components 
 
To understand the differences in the cost of credit by race, ethnicity and income, first 
separate regressions are estimated for the determinants of interest rates, here proxied by 
mortgage rates, the chances of having loans from particular sources, specifically from 
traditional banks and from consumer banks,8 and the share of loans from specific sources, 
limited again to mortgages as the largest single source of loans.   
 
The determinants on mortgage rates are estimated since comprehensive interest rate 
information on all loans is not available. The regression equation is based on a credit 
supply function since interest rates are determined by lenders under credit rationing.  
 
The results show interest rate differences by race and ethnicity. There was a gap by 
ethnicity in the earlier period, which disappeared over time (Table 5). In comparison, 
though, the difference between whites and African-Americans became statistically 
significant over time. Similarly, income played only a significant role after 1995. Thus, 
credit market differences by income appear to have changed from loan denials to cost of 
credit over time (Table 5).  
 
In addition, structural differences matter for mortgage rates. Specifically, professional 
information is associated with lower mortgage rates (Table 5).  
 
**** INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE **** 
 
The source of credit may be another potential source of cost differences. Loans from 
consumer banks, such as credit cards and installment loans, tend to carry substantially 
higher interest rates than loans from traditional lenders, such as commercial banks 
(Weller, 2007). I estimate two separate logit regressions, whereby the dependent variable 
                                                 
8 Traditional lenders include commercial banks, savings and loans, and real estate lenders. Consumer banks 
include credit card lenders and finance companies.  
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takes on the value of “1” if the family has a loan from a traditional bank and from a 
consumer bank, respectively. The explanatory variables are the same as for the 
determinants of loan denials, with the exception of the homeownership dummy and the 
value of net worth due to the obvious simultaneity problems.  
 
Minorities and lower-income families are less likely than their counterparts to borrow 
from traditional banks (Table 6). The gap by race, ethnicity and income, though, declined 
over time. 
 
Structural differences seem to matter for having a relationship with traditional banks. 
Families, who relied on professional information, were significantly more likely to have 
loans from traditional banks than those, who did not (Table 6). Also, higher incomes are 
correlated with a larger probability of having a relationship with traditional banks. Hence, 
structural inequities may pose an obstacle to a relationship with lower-cost providers.  
 
**** INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE **** 
 
The fact that minorities borrowed less from traditional lenders, though, does not mean 
that they were more likely to borrow from typically more costly sources, such as finance 
companies and credit card companies. There is no statistically significant difference by 
race and ethnicity when it comes to borrowing from consumer lenders (Table 7). The 
combination of these results with the ones on traditional banks, which showed a lower 
likelihood for minorities than for whites to have a loan from such banks, is consistent 
with the earlier finding that denied and discouraged applications are larger for minorities. 
It again indicates that minorities have less bank credit than whites.  
 
In a similar vein, professional information also increases the probability of having a loan 
from a consumer bank, confirming the earlier finding that professional information 
reduces the chance of loan denial. It could suggest that professional information does not 
matter for the cost of credit, although the results further below do not lend support to this.  
 
**** INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE **** 
 
Finally, there are only differences in the composition of debt, measured by the share of 
mortgages out of total loans, by race (Table 8). The results indicate a statistically 
significant difference between African-Americans and whites, which declines over time. 
There is no systematic difference between Hispanics and whites. Also, the results indicate 
that income reduced the share of mortgages out of total debt in the earlier years, but not 
in the later years. This may indicate that higher-income families have access to a range of 
loan products. Similarly, relying on professional information reduces the share of 
mortgages, which is consistent with lower loan denials.  
 
**** INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE **** 
 
IV.3 Total cost of credit 
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To analyze the determinants of the total debt payments, an OLS regression is estimated. 
Importantly, the results on differences in debt payments can shed some light on possible 
fee differences, when considered in connection with the previous results on interest rate 
differences. For instance, if debt payments are higher for some groups than others, but 
interest rates are statistically indistinguishable, it would imply that fees and other non-
interest payments are higher for the group with the higher payments. 
 
The explanatory variables are similar to those used before, with some additions. In 
particular, the regression includes interactive terms between race, ethnicity, income and 
type of financial institutions and the share of mortgages out of total debt. These 
interactive terms are meant to test if there is a differential cost effect of the sources and 
types of loans on the overall cost of credit by race, ethnicity, and income. These 
differences were not controlled for in the previous results, but could explain credit market 
differences, e.g. if credit steering occurs within a given financial institution.  
 
Differences in the cost of credit widened by race and ethnicity over time. Specifically, the 
estimated coefficients for African-Americans and Hispanics indicate no significant cost 
difference with whites for the years 1989 to 1995, while African-Americans and 
Hispanics had larger debt payments than whites between 1998 and 2004 (Table 9).  
 
The results indicate that higher debt payments in the later period followed higher interest 
rates for African-Americans. The same was not true for Hispanics. It is thus possible that 
higher debt payments for Hispanics between 1998 and 2004 thus mirrored higher costs 
other than interest, such as fees, for Hispanics than for whites.9 
 
Another estimate, though, shows an offsetting effect on total cost of credit. The 
interactive term for African-Americans and consumer banks indicates that having a loan 
from a consumer bank lowers total cost for African-Americans more so than for others 
(Table 9). The results are large enough to almost offset the difference between whites and 
African-Americans, at least for those families who borrow from consumer banks. This 
may reflect the fact that some forms of credit, primarily credit card debt, often require 
only minimal debt payments, which could result in low principle payments offsetting 
other, larger costs associated with these loans, such as higher interest rates.10  
 
The differences by race, however, are exacerbated by the estimate on mortgage shares. 
The share of mortgages out of total debt was inversely related to debt payments and the 
share of mortgages was lower for African-Americans than for whites (Table 9).  
 
                                                 
9 The alternative that Hispanics moved increasingly towards loan features that required larger principle 
payments is not supported by the previous results and the fact that Hispanics relied more and more on 
ARMs and similar mortgage products that required lower initial payments.  
10 The alternative interpretation that African-Americans receive lower-cost loans from consumer banks than 
whites do is not supported by the data. A multivariate analysis of interest rates on installment loans shows 
this. Installment loans are the typical loan product from finance companies and are about four times as 
large credit card debt. This analysis shows that African-Americans paid the same interest rates as whites on 
installment loans. Details are available from the author upon request.  
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In comparison, additional estimates indicate show smaller differences by ethnicity. For 
example, the interactive terms between Hispanics and the mortgage share has an 
estimated statistically significant negative sign, so that the mortgage share of Hispanics 
lowers total costs more than it does for other groups after 1995. This may reflect a 
growing reliance on ARMs among Hispanics during this period (Weller, 2006). As long 
as the share of ARMs among Hispanics increased, the share of mortgages with lower 
payments should also have increased.11 
 
*** INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE **** 
 
Income was inversely related to debt payments in the earlier period, but positively related 
after 1995 (Table 9). One possible explanation for the positive coefficient in the latter 
period may be that higher-income families held less debt with variable repayment 
options, such as credit card debt (Weller and Douglas, 2007). This type of debt may allow 
lower-income families to reduce their payments by paying less principle over longer time 
spans. Principle payments would thus have been comparatively larger for higher-income 
families and total debt payments relative to debt may hence have risen with income.  
 
Further, higher-income families had larger debt payments than their counterparts if they 
had loans from consumer lenders. This may indicate higher-income families were less 
likely than lower-income families to take advantage of longer payment periods possible 
for some consumer loans.  
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
This paper looks at trends in credit access and the costs of credit to see if credit market 
discrimination has disappeared or at least declined over time.  
 
The figures show widening gaps in credit access and costs of credit by race. African-
Americans became more likely than whites to be denied loans, and they faced a greater 
credit cost difference relative to whites in the later years than in the earlier years.  
 
In comparison, Hispanics saw equalizing credit access and credit costs relative to whites. 
To some degree, though, the improvements for Hispanics may have been offset by 
continued gaps in fees and other non-interest costs. 
 
There were also signs of growing gaps in income. In particular, lower-income families 
seemed to have been charged higher interest rates than their counterparts. 
 
Minorities and lower-income families seemed more likely than their counterparts to take 
advantage of loan features that reduced payments, such as credit cards with low required 
minimum principle payments and ARMs, which allowed them to shrink the cost gap.  
 
The results indicate that taste-based discrimination and structural discrimination may 
have persisted and possibly increased over time.  
                                                 
11 The end of the rapid proliferation of ARMs followed after the data years.  
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To respond to persistent differences, public policy could make it easier, e.g. by making it 
less costly, for people to get information from professionals may help reduce differences 
in credit market outcomes by race, ethnicity and income. When families rely on 
professional information, e.g. from lawyers, brokers, accountants, among others, they can 
significantly reduce the chances of loan denials. Minorities and lower-income families, 
though, rely much less on professionals, when making decisions on debt. Thus, easier 
access to professional information may reduce credit market differences. 
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Table 1: Share of discouraged and denied loan applications, 1989 to 2004 
 
 
Year 
 
1989 
 
1992 
 
1995 
 
1998 
 
2001 
 
2004 
 
1989 to 2001 
 
2001 to 2004 
 
1989 to 2004 
 
Did not apply because of fear of being turned down 
 
       
Total 5.5 5.3 8.3 6.7 7.0 6.9 1.5 -0.1 1.4 
White 3.4 3.7 5.7 4.4 4.1 4.9 0.7 0.7 1.5 
African-American 13.5 8.6 21.3 15.2 16.6 14.9 3.2 -1.8 1.4 
Hispanic 10.5 14.6 13.8 17.3 16.5 11.9 6.0 -4.6 1.4 
Bottom quintile 10.8 8.8 15.2 12.5 13.6 11.9 2.8 -1.7 1.2 
Second quintile 5.9 5.9 8.7 8.3 9.7 10.2 3.9 0.5 4.4 
Middle quintile 3.6 4.9 8.3 4.6 5.8 6.6 2.2 0.8 3.0 
Fourth quintile 2.7 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.3 2.6 0.7 -0.7 0.0 
Top quintile 2.8 2.0 2.3 2.1 1.5 2.9 -1.3 1.3 0.1 
 
Applied, denied, and could not get full amount elsewhere 
 
       
Total 11.6 14.8 12.1 12.6 12.3 13.0 0.7 0.7 1.4 
White 10.1 12.4 10.3 11.5 10.8 10.8 0.8 0.0 0.7 
African-American 13.0 25.4 20.2 20.0 18.3 22.0 5.3 3.7 9.0 
Hispanic 20.6 21.6 17.0 13.9 16.1 18.1 -4.5 2.0 -2.5 
Bottom quintile 11.9 17.2 13.0 12.7 12.2 13.2 0.3 1.0 1.3 
Second quintile 17.1 17.8 15.1 15.4 17.0 19.4 -0.1 2.4 2.3 
Middle quintile 11.3 16.8 13.0 16.7 15.0 15.7 3.6 0.7 4.4 
Fourth quintile 12.2 12.6 12.0 10.4 11.0 12.7 -1.2 1.7 0.5 
Top quintile 
 
4.8 8.1 6.1 7.0 5.8 4.5 1.0 -1.3 -0.3 
 
Notes: All figures in percent. Source is Weller (2008).  
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Table 2: Median debt payments relative to debt, 1989 to 2004 
 
 
Year 
 
1989 
 
 
1992 
 
1995 
 
1998 
 
2001 
 
2004 
 
1989 to 2001 
 
2001 to 2004 
 
1989 to 2004 
Total 28.2 24.9 23.7 21.6 20.8 16.8 -7.4 -4.0 -11.4 
White 25.5 23.0 22.0 20.4 19.6 15.7 -5.9 -3.8 -9.7 
African-American 36.0 30.0 30.0 29.4 28.6 22.1 -7.5 -6.4 -13.9 
Hispanic 29.9 30.0 25.0 29.7 25.9 19.7 -4.0 -6.2 -10.2 
Bottom quintile 36.6 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 27.7 -6.6 -2.3 -8.9 
Second quintile 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 23.2 0.0 -6.8 -6.8 
Middle quintile 30.0 27.3 25.7 24.0 24.6 17.4 -5.4 -7.1 -12.6 
Fourth quintile 23.1 22.0 20.0 17.8 18.7 16.0 -4.5 -2.7 -7.2 
Top quintile 
 
20.3 17.6 17.1 16.7 15.9 13.3 -4.3 -2.6 -7.0 
 
Notes: Only households with any debt payments are included. All figures in percent. Source is Weller (2008).  
 
Table 3: Logit regression of discouraged loan applications 
 
  
Before 1998 
 
 
After 1995 
 
After 1995, extra 
variables 
Personal charactstcs. Coeff. Std. dev.  Coeff. Std. dev.  Coeff. Std. dev.  
HH head has less than 
high school degree 
0.564*** 0.177 0.723*** 0.161 0.721*** 0.161 
HH head has high 
school degree 
0.259* 0.147 0.391*** 0.129 0.383*** 0.130 
HH head has some 
college 
0.271 0.169 0.275* 0.143 0.269* 0.144 
Age 0.079*** 0.021 0.071*** 0.018 0.068*** 0.019 
Age2 -0.001*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 
Family size -0.003 0.037 0.058** 0.029 0.057* 0.029 
Married 0.191 0.177 0.067 0.138 0.057 0.138 
Single women 0.309** 0.157 0.231* 0.132 0.221* 0.132 
African-American 0.638*** 0.133 0.664*** 0.111 0.660*** 0.112 
Hispanic 0.405** 0.173 0.289** 0.141 0.275* 0.142 
Other race or ethnicity 0.303 3.317 0.325 3.317 0.331 3.317 
Credit history       
HH has been delinquent 
on payments 
0.314* 0.184 0.409*** 0.140 0.380*** 0.142 
HH has declared 
bankruptcy in the past 
    0.275* 0.163 
Payments relative to 
income 
-0.012 0.056 -0.006 0.011 -0.006 0.011 
Number of financial 
institutions 
-0.146*** 0.037 -0.222*** 0.036 -0.221*** 0.036 
HH self-identifies as 
saver 
-0.183 0.123 -0.177* 0.098 -0.167* 0.098 
HH collects debt 
information itself 
    0.111 0.110 
HH relies on 
professional advice 
    -0.147 0.099 
HH relies on 
advertisements 
    0.034 0.117 
Financial characteristics 
Income (1,000s of 2004 
dollars) 
-0.008*** 0.003 -0.005** 0.002 -0.005** 0.002 
Net worth (10,000s of 
2004 dollars) 
0.000 0.001 -0.005 0.004 -0.004 0.004 
HH is home owner -0.414*** 0.136 -0.735*** 0.114 -0.723*** 0.114 
Constant -3.518*** 0.483 -3.236*** 0.414 -3.230*** 0.419 
N 11279 13171 13171 
F-Statistic 98.17 189.63 155.62 
P-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: Dependent variable is equal to one if household was discouraged from applying and zero otherwise. * 
indicates significance at 10-level, ** indicates significance at 5-level, *** indicates significance at 1-level.  
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Table 4: Logit Regression of Loan Denial Rates 
 
 
Explanatory variable 
 
Before 1998 
 
 
After 1995 
 
After 1995, extra 
variables 
Personal characteristics Coeff. Std. dev.  Coeff. Std. dev.  Coeff. Std. dev.  
HH head has less than 
high school degree 
0.021 0.148 0.210 0.132 0.211 0.133 
HH head has high 
school degree 
0.078 0.112 0.267*** 0.095 0.245** 0.096 
HH head has some 
college 
0.279** 0.117 0.499*** 0.098 0.472*** 0.099 
Age 0.058*** 0.018 0.039** 0.015 0.027* 0.016 
Age2 -0.001*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 
Family size 0.054* 0.032 0.062** 0.028 0.052* 0.028 
Married -0.096 0.134 0.127 0.118 0.116 0.118 
Single women -0.085 0.128 0.222** 0.111 0.213* 0.112 
African-American 0.402*** 0.112 0.348*** 0.095 0.319*** 0.095 
Hispanic 0.223 0.154 -0.066 0.123 -0.059 0.125 
Other race or ethnicity 0.184 3.317 -0.155 3.317 -0.134 3.317 
Credit history       
HH has been delinquent 
on payments 
1.332*** 0.144 1.356*** 0.103 1.288*** 0.105 
HH has declared 
bankruptcy in the past 
    0.935*** 0.135 
Payments relative to 
income 
0.003 0.011 -0.006 0.006 -0.005 0.006 
Number of financial 
institutions 
0.073*** 0.024 0.093*** 0.022 0.091*** 0.022 
HH self-identifies as 
saver 
-0.479*** 0.087 -0.505*** 0.076 -0.481*** 0.076 
HH collects debt 
information itself 
    0.086 0.091 
HH relies on 
professionals  
    -0.190*** 0.074 
HH relies on 
advertisements  
    0.325*** 0.083 
Financial characteristics 
Income (1,000s of 2004 
dollars) 
-0.004** 0.002 -0.002 0.001 -0.002 0.001 
Net worth (10,000s of 
2004 dollars) 
-0.001 0.001 -0.002* 0.001 -0.002 0.001 
HH is home owner -0.481*** 0.096 -0.535*** 0.086 -0.513*** 0.087 
Constant -2.172*** 0.375 -2.128*** 0.331 -1.992*** 0.342 
N 11279  13177  13177  
F-Statistic 156.34  235.78  208.44  
P-Value 0.000  0.000  0.000  
Notes: Dependent variable is equal to one if household was denied a loan application and zero otherwise. * indicates 
significance at 10-level, ** indicates significance at 5-level, *** indicates significance at 1-level.  
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Table 5: Regression for mortgage interest rates 
 
Personal 
characteristics 
Coeff. 
 
Std. dev.  Coeff. 
 
Std. dev.  Coeff. 
 
Std. dev.  
HH head has less than 
high school degree 
63.926*** 16.363 87.188*** 15.708 85.727*** 15.932 
HH head has high 
school degree 
37.244*** 9.253 61.844*** 7.964 60.599*** 7.8677 
HH head has some 
college 
35.147*** 10.420 50.488*** 8.492 48.691*** 8.4118 
Age -0.594 2.300 2.838* 1.565 2.9314* 1.5859 
age2 -0.006 0.024 -0.034** 0.016 -0.036** 0.0160 
family size 7.880** 3.286 -1.025 2.764 -1.533 2.7710 
Married -35.207** 16.900 9.194 11.527 10.671 11.429 
single women -20.671 19.119 12.929 14.383 14.837 14.292 
African-American 14.626 17.203 59.938*** 13.752 54.486*** 13.760 
Hispanic 49.121*** 18.843 -10.301 14.883 -11.24 14.867 
Other race or ethnicity 32.427*** 8.171 -30.009*** 9.901 -29.43*** 9.8059 
Credit history       
HH self-identifies as 
saver 
-20.022** 7.844 -34.733*** 6.443 -32.85*** 6.3357 
No. of financial 
institutions 
-3.050 1.861 5.050*** 1.936 5.1214*** 1.9127 
HH collects debt 
information itself 
    28.235*** 8.1910 
HH relies on 
professionals  
    -12.48** 6.3624 
HH relies on 
advertisements  
    -23.54** 9.6966 
Financial 
characteristics 
      
Income (1,000s of 
2004 dollars) 
0.001 0.006 -0.020** 0.009 -0.019** 0.0085 
Constant 948.697*** 55.040 646.048*** 38.865 665.97*** 39.403 
       
N 5473 6340 6340 
R-Squared 0.037 0.052 0.058 
F-statistic 42.43 65.79 57.68 
p-value 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Notes: Dependent variable is mortgage rate times 1,000. Only households with mortgage rates greater than zero are 
included. * indicates significance at 10-level, ** indicates significance at 5-level, *** indicates significance at 1-
level.  
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Table 6: Logit regression of households having credit from traditional banks 
 
 
Explanatory variable 
 
Before 1998 
 
 
After 1995 
 
After 1995, extra 
variables 
 
Personal 
characteristics 
Coefficient Standard 
deviation 
Coefficient Standard 
deviation 
Coefficient Standard 
deviation 
Household head has 
less than high school 
degree 
-0.588*** 0.092 -0.806*** 0.106 -0.727*** 0.107 
Household head has 
high school degree 
-0.385*** 0.071 -0.376*** 0.075 -0.332*** 0.076 
Household head has 
some college 
-0.065 0.079 -0.211** 0.083 -0.195** 0.083 
Age 0.1538*** 0.011 0.1497*** 0.012 0.1438*** 0.012 
Age2 -0.001*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 
Family size 0.0947*** 0.022 0.0887*** 0.025 0.0917*** 0.026 
Married 0.3305*** 0.109 0.1926* 0.115 0.1872 0.115 
Single women 0.1401 0.098 -0.318*** 0.101 -0.313*** 0.102 
African-American -0.570*** 0.090 -0.379*** 0.099 -0.359*** 0.099 
Hispanic -0.752*** 0.119 -0.531*** 0.120 -0.488*** 0.120 
Other race or ethnicity -0.302*** 0.066 -0.677*** 0.074 -0.669*** 0.073 
Credit history       
HH has been 
delinquent on 
payments 
    0.0092 0.132 
HH has declared 
bankruptcy in the past 
    -0.172 0.149 
Saver 0.1757*** 0.056 0.2368*** 0.060 0.2006*** 0.062 
HH collects 
information itself 
    0.3023*** 0.073 
HH relies on 
professionals advice 
    0.3453*** 0.060 
Household relies on 
advertisements  
    0.1333* 0.077 
Financial 
characteristics 
      
Income (1,000s of 
2004 dollars) 
0.0015*** 0.001 0.0004** 0.000 0.0004** 0.000 
Employment 0.5096 3.317 0.4337 3.317 0.4163 3.317 
Constant -4.096*** 0.273 -3.833*** 0.307 -4.127*** 0.313 
       
N 11348 8747 8747 
F-Statistic 372.2 291.31 227.69 
P-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
 
Notes: Dependent variable is equal to one if household has any debt and zero otherwise. * indicates significance at 
10-level, ** indicates significance at 5-level, *** indicates significance at 1-level.  
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Table 7: Logit regression of households having credit from consumer banks 
 
 
Explanatory variable 
 
Before 1998 
 
 
After 1995 
 
After 1995, extra 
variables 
 
Personal 
characteristics 
Coefficient Standard 
deviation 
Coefficient Standard 
deviation 
Coefficient Standard 
deviation 
Household head has 
less than high school 
degree 
-0.380*** 0.0856 -0.501*** 0.0952 -0.435*** 0.0973 
Household head has 
high school degree 
-0.005 0.0665 -0.114 0.0725 -0.080 0.0740 
Household head has 
some college 
0.2307*** 0.0771 0.2376*** 0.0805 0.2505*** 0.0814 
Age 0.0834*** 0.0101 0.0880*** 0.0104 0.0799*** 0.0105 
Age2 -0.001*** 0.0001 -0.001*** 0.0001 -0.001*** 0.0001 
Family size 0.0663*** 0.0213 0.0646*** 0.0248 0.0552** 0.0249 
Married 0.1606 0.1012 0.0778 0.1080 0.0846 0.1093 
Single women 0.1961** 0.0879 0.2508*** 0.0916 0.2674*** 0.0928 
African-American -0.013 0.0856 0.1083 0.0874 0.0593 0.0887 
Hispanic -0.150 0.1128 -0.126 0.1113 -0.111 0.1140 
Other race or ethnicity -0.201*** 0.0629 -0.362*** 0.0700 -0.402*** 0.0704 
Credit history       
HH has been 
delinquent on 
payments 
    0.9232*** 0.1493 
HH has declared 
bankruptcy in the past 
    0.0888 0.1525 
Saver -0.009 0.0539 -0.164*** 0.0572 -0.143** 0.0585 
HH collects 
information itself 
    0.3831*** 0.0670 
HH relies on 
professionals advice 
    0.1154** 0.0579 
Household relies on 
advertisements  
    0.4271*** 0.0757 
Financial 
characteristics 
      
Income (1,000s of 
2004 dollars) 
-0.000** 0.0004 -0.001*** 0.0002 -0.001*** 0.0002 
Employment 0.5404 3.3166 0.5263 3.3166 0.5238 3.3166 
Constant -2.165*** 0.2506 -1.875*** 0.2669 -2.261*** 0.2737 
       
N 11348 8747 8747 
F-Statistic 231.09 217.67 182.26 
P-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Notes: Dependent variable is equal to one if household has any debt and zero otherwise. * indicates significance at 
10-level, ** indicates significance at 5-level, *** indicates significance at 1-level.  
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Table 8: Regression for mortgage share out of total debt 
 
Personal 
characteristics 
Coeff. 
 
Std. dev.  Coeff. 
 
Std. dev.  Coeff. 
 
Std. dev.  
HH head has less than 
high school degree 
-0.043*** 0.0162 -0.024* 0.0138 -0.026* 0.0138 
HH head has high 
school degree 
-0.054*** 0.0099 -0.027*** 0.0078 -0.028*** 0.0078 
HH head has some 
college 
-0.027*** 0.0105 -0.030*** 0.0086 -0.030*** 0.0086 
Age -0.005** 0.0023 -0.003** 0.0015 -0.003** 0.0015 
age2 0.0000** 0.0000 0.0000** 0.0000 0.0000** 0.0000 
family size 0.0032 0.0028 0.0024 0.0025 0.0027 0.0025 
Married -0.044*** 0.0151 -0.039*** 0.0109 -0.040*** 0.0109 
single women 0.0080 0.0165 0.0013 0.0120 -0.000 0.0119 
African-American -0.082*** 0.0184 -0.031** 0.0128 -0.031** 0.0128 
Hispanic 0.0172 0.0181 0.0083 0.0130 0.0060 0.0129 
Other race or ethnicity 0.0037 3.3166 0.0191 3.3166 0.0171 3.3166 
Credit history       
HH self-identifies as 
saver 
0.0054 0.0081 0.0119* 0.0065 0.0136** 0.0065 
No. of financial 
institutions 
-0.013*** 0.0024 -0.011*** 0.0019 -0.011*** 0.0019 
HH collects debt 
information itself 
    0.0045 0.0083 
HH relies on 
professionals  
    -0.018*** 0.0062 
HH relies on 
advertisements  
    -0.012* 0.0077 
Financial 
characteristics 
      
Income (1,000s of 
2004 dollars) 
-0.000** 0.0000 -0.000 0.0000 -0.000 0.0000 
Constant 1.0572*** 0.0539 0.9821*** 0.0385 0.9847*** 0.0388 
       
N 4935 5976 5976 
R-Squared 0.042 0.023 0.026 
F-statistic 46.44 37.71 35.52 
p-value 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Notes: Dependent variable is mortgage rate times 1,000. Only households with mortgage rates greater than zero are 
included. * indicates significance at 10-level, ** indicates significance at 5-level, *** indicates significance at 1-
level.  
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Table 9: Regression estimates for debt payments relative to total debt 
 
 
Explanatory variables 
 
Before 1998 
 
 
After 1995 
 
After 1995, extra 
variables 
 
Personal characteristics Coeff. 
 
Std. dev.  Coeff. Std. dev.  Coeff. Std. dev.  
HH head has less than 
high school degree 
0.303*** 0.076 0.227*** 0.078 0.227*** 0.078 
HH head has high school 
degree 
0.152*** 0.033 0.055** 0.027 0.055** 0.027 
HH head has some 
college 
0.056 0.043 0.008 0.032 0.008 0.033 
Age -0.006 0.009 -0.001 0.008 0.000 0.008 
age2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Family size 0.024 0.016 0.011 0.012 0.060 0.048 
Married -0.026 0.065 0.061 0.049 0.012 0.012 
Single women 0.047 0.074 0.045 0.043 0.045 0.043 
African-American 0.340 0.221 0.504* 0.271 0.514* 0.273 
Hispanic 0.381 0.348 1.209 0.735 1.216* 0.735 
Other race or ethnicity 0.033 0.050 0.003 0.039 0.004 0.038 
Credit history       
HH self-identifies as 
saver 
-0.010 0.033 0.020 0.026 0.013 0.026 
HH has been delinquent 
on payments 
    -0.110** 0.054 
No. of financial 
institutions 
-0.040*** 0.010 -0.030*** 0.010 -0.030*** 0.010 
HH collects debt 
information itself 
    -0.012 0.037 
HH relies on 
professionals for debt 
information 
    -0.007 0.026 
HH relies on 
advertisements for debt 
information 
    0.003 0.026 
HH has loan from credit 
union 
0.022 0.078 -0.014 0.038 -0.014 0.038 
HH has loan from 
traditional lender 
-0.103** 0.045 -0.038 0.033 -0.039 0.033 
HH has loan from 
consumer bank 
-0.317*** 0.057 -0.226*** 0.042 -0.226*** 0.042 
Share of mortgages out of 
total debt 
-0.388*** 0.139 -0.445*** 0.124 -0.451*** 0.125 
Loans from CU and 
African-American 
-0.025 0.138 0.114 0.113 0.119 0.112 
Loans from CU and 
Hispanic 
-0.102 0.158 0.037 0.158 0.039 0.158 
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Explanatory variables 
 
Before 1998 
 
 
After 1995 
 
After 1995, extra 
variables 
 
Loans from CU and 
income 
-0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Loans from traditional 
bank and African-
American 
0.094 0.159 -0.022 0.116 -0.021 0.115 
Loans from traditional 
bank and Hispanic 
-0.145 0.207 -0.321 0.260 -0.320 0.260 
Loans from traditional 
bank and income 
0.0001** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Loans from consumer 
bank and African-
American 
-0.245 0.217 -0.435** 0.220 -0.437** 0.221 
Loans from consumer 
bank and Hispanic 
-0.160 0.291 -0.952 0.584 -0.963 0.585 
Loans from consumer 
bank and income 
0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 
Mortgage share and 
African-American 
-0.232 3.317 -0.145 3.317 -0.153 3.317 
Mortgage share and 
Hispanic 
-0.298*** 0.095 -0.403*** 0.049 -0.408*** 0.050 
Mortgage share and low-
income 
-0.130 0.179 -0.067 0.225 -0.057 0.225 
Mortgage share and 
moderate-income 
-0.125*** 0.036 -0.005 0.062 -0.025 0.025 
Mortgage share and 
middle-income 
-0.065 0.063 0.015 0.053 -0.003 0.061 
Mortgage share and high-
income 
-0.038 0.042 -0.033 0.025 0.016 0.052 
Income (1,000s of 2004 
dollars) 
-0.001** 0.000 0.0001*** 0.000 0.0001*** 0.000 
Constant 1.069*** 0.204 0.773*** 0.208 0.791*** 0.207 
       
N 7990 9469 9469 
R-squared 0.027 0.061 0.061 
F-statistic 88.41 97.70 80.98 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
 
Notes: Dependent variable is share of debt payments to debt. Only households with debt payments greater than zero 
are included. * indicates significance at 10-level, ** indicates significance at 5-level, *** indicates significance at 1-
level.  
 
